Here are two interesting documents relating to so-called "net piracy".
The first is this plain English piece by Paul Marks in the 3/12/2009 New Scientist about the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA, an international treaty) currently under discussion in the G8, and which internet service providers are getting increasingly anxious about. Here, for example, is a comment on ACTA by Andrew Heaney, a senior executive at TalkTalk, the third largest UK ISP:
"This is the kind of snooping you'd expect in China, not a modern western democracy. It raises huge questions over privacy invasion and freedom of expression."
The second is the the civil liberties campaign organisation Liberty's critique of the Digital Economy Bill's anti file-sharing measures [86 kB PDF], which it argues are disproportionate and liable to infringe citizens' human rights. Long excerpt:
that orders by the Secretary of State under clause 11 “would require ISPs to take
measures to limit internet access to certain subscribers” and “would be likely to
include bandwith capping or shaping that would make it difficult for subscribers to
continue file-sharing but other measures may also be considered. If appropriate
temporary suspension of broadband connections could be considered”. These
technical measures implemented at the Secretary of State’s behest may therefore
include disconnection.
15. Article 10 of the HRA, the right to freedom of expression, includes within its
definition the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas. This right is, of
course, not absolute and can be limited to an extent shown to be necessary and
proportionate in achieving a legitimate aim, for example protecting the rights of
others. While the Government’s professed aim of protecting copyright is indeed
legitimate, it is doubtful that this second model is a proportionate means of achieving
that aim. Proportionality demands that in pursuing policies that interfere with rights,
the least intrusive method of securing a policy objective is used. The automatic
sanction of disconnection and other potential technical measures are by their very
nature highly intrusive. The level of interference with the right to receive and impart
information and ideas is made only more acute by the fact that we are in an age
where people increasingly rely on the internet to allow them to gain access to
information and provide information to others. That this Bill seeks to create two
possible models for addressing copyright infringement – one that includes an
automatic sanction and one which provides a mechanism to allow copyright owners
to pursue suspected infringers in the court room - serves only to highlight the
disproportionate nature of this second model.
16. What’s more, automatic disconnection is likely to be largely indiscriminate in
its application. As mentioned above in relation to model 1, evidence of suspected
infringement will not amount to evidence of a specific suspected infringer rather an
account holder whose internet subscription may have been used by another to
infringe copyright. Deciphering whether or not an account holder or another is the
suspected infringer is certainly not possible at the stage at which technical measures
would be imposed under this model. The likelihood is therefore that many who have
not themselves infringed copyright will be subjected to the automatic sanctions
including disconnection. Additionally, and also mentioned above in relation to
model 1, internet use is often collectivist in nature. Whole households, workplaces, or
communities can access the internet using one IP address. An automatic sanction of
disconnection on suspicion of copyright infringement will therefore have a far wider
impact than simply cutting internet access for a suspected infringer. Those who use
the same connection will also have their right to receive and impart information and
ideas unjustifiably interfered with.
17. Putting aside direct executive interference, the unwise order-making model
and the automatic and severe sanction; Liberty believes that the wording of the
power would need significant amendment. As it stands the order-making power is
shockingly broad in its framing. While the explanatory notes state that the
Government intends for technical measures only to be applied against copyright
infringers,6 as currently drafted the clause allows the Secretary of State, by order, to
impose a technical obligation on ISPs to apply technical measures against any
internet subscriber for any reason. The power could not be framed any more widely
that its current form. The order-making power will at best allow the Secretary of State
to order that those suspected of copyright infringements have technical measures
applied and at worst it will allow the Secretary of State to order any subscriber or
category of subscriber to have technical measures applied for whatever reason. In
principle, as drafted, the Secretary of State could require that ISPs cut off those using
(or allowing others to use) the internet to access particular websites or services
regardless of whether or not any copyright is infringed. The Secretary of State could
for example order that those accessing websites that fit a particular criteria be cut off
– for example political or religious websites considered to be extreme. It takes little
imagination to envisage where such a power could lead. What has been described
as a power to cut off illegal file-sharers is in fact better described as a power to cut of
internet access for whomever the Secretary of State sees fit.
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